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Research on Theory-of-Mind (ToM) has mainly focused on ages of core ToM
development. This article follows a quantitative approach focusing on the level of
ToM understanding on a measurement scale, the ToM Storybooks, in 324 typically
developing children between 3 and 11 years of age. It deals with the eventual occurrence
of developmental non-linearities in ToM functioning, using smoothing techniques,
dynamic growth model building and additional indicators, namely moving skewness,
moving growth rate changes and moving variability. The ToM sum-scores showed an
overall developmental trend that leveled off toward the age of 10 years. Within this overall
trend two non-linearities in the group-based change pattern were found: a plateau at
the age of around 56 months and a dip at the age of 72–78 months. These temporary
regressions in ToM sum-score were accompanied by a decrease in growth rate and
variability, and a change in skewness of the ToM data, all suggesting a developmental
shift in ToM understanding. The temporary decreases also occurred in the different ToM
sub-scores and most clearly so in the core ToM component of beliefs. It was also found
that girls had an earlier growth spurt than boys and that the underlying developmental
path was more salient in girls than in boys. The consequences of these findings are
discussed from various theoretical points of view, with an emphasis on a dynamic
systems interpretation of the underlying developmental paths.
Keywords: Theory-of-Mind, ToM_Storybooks, development, dynamic_systems_theory, non-linearities, anomaly
INTRODUCTION
Theory-of-Mind
The child’s Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is an important condition for showing socially adequate
behavior (Astington and Jenkins, 1995; Imuta et al., 2016). ToM refers to the ability to attribute
mental states – such as beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and perceptions – to oneself and others
and to use these mental states in understanding, predicting, and explaining the behavior of oneself
and others (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Mitchell, 1997).
For instance, a child comprehends that if Sam thinks his soccer ball is in the garage (a belief),
he will look in the garage for this soccer ball (the consecutive action), even though the soccer ball
may in reality be in the garden. A typical five-year-old who is questioned about the actions of Sam
and who also knows the true location of the soccer ball will be able to predict the action of Sam
correctly. A typical three-year-old, however, will not be able to do so: he will most likely say that
Sam will look in the garden. The 3 year old cannot distance himself from the knowledge of the true
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location, and he does not comprehend that others can hold beliefs
that do not match reality as he sees it. He does not grasp false
beliefs yet.
Numerous studies have suggested that a distinct change occurs
in understanding these false beliefs between the age of 3 and
5 years old (for meta-analyses on false beliefs see Wellman
et al., 2001; Liu et al., 2008). Though considered a cornerstone
ability, ToM is far more than only false belief understanding and
also extends beyond the 3–5 age period. Infants already possess
‘implicit’ mindreading capacities (Slaughter, 2015), treating
themselves and others as intentional agents and experiencers;
while older children understand lies and deception (Peterson
and Siegal, 2002). Research shows that ToM development even
prolongs into late adolescence (Dumontheil et al., 2010; Vetter
et al., 2013; Valle et al., 2015).
Developmental Sequences in
Theory-of-Mind
Research has shown that ToM develops in normally developing
children according to a particular, age-related sequence. It evolves
from a simple desire theory to a complete belief-desire theory,
from true beliefs to false beliefs, and from the understanding
of first-order beliefs to second-order beliefs (Wellman, 1990).
Deviations from this normal developmental path have been used
in describing ToM difficulties of, for instance, children with
autism (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Peterson et al., 2012). Relatively
little research has been done on the effect of gender on ToM
development, but, some studies have found an advantage for
girls (Charman et al., 2002; Calero et al., 2013), including the
finding that the association between ToM and prosocial behavior
is stronger in girls than in boys (Imuta et al., 2016).
Wellman and Liu (2004) looked into the conceptual changes
of different ToM aspects, using the ToM Scale. They found
a consistent progression of conceptual achievements that
pace ToM understanding in normally developing children:
diverse desires > diverse beliefs > knowledge access > false
belief > hidden emotion (Wellman, 2012, 2014). Wellman and
Liu (2004, pp. 536) argue that the ToM developmental order
is not one of addition or substitution, but one of modification
or mediation. Initial insights broaden or generalize into later
insights, following orderly conceptual progressions. A conceptual
development has recently also been demonstrated for more
advanced ToM tasks (Osterhaus et al., 2016).
Temporary Regressions in Development
One can question how these ToM generalizations come about.
Is there a gradual development or are there temporary
accelerations, delays or even regressions observable during
ToM development? Temporary regressions imply that children
can have a temporary relapse before a newly acquired ability
consolidates. This phenomenon is often referred to as U-shaped
or N-shaped development (Siegler, 2004; Zelazo, 2004).
Temporary regressions have been found in a variety of
domains, including motor and verbal development (Gershkoff-
Stowe and Thelen, 2004; Swingley, 2009), non-verbal symbol
learning (Namy et al., 2004), face perception (Cashon and Cohen,
2004), false belief understanding (Bernstein et al., 2011), intent-
based moral judgments (Margoni and Surian, 2016), creativity,
reasoning, and auditory localization (for an early collection of
studies, see Strauss and Stavy, 1982; for modeling this U-shaped
development, see Morse et al., 2011; for a recent overview, see
Pauls et al., 2013).
In addition to temporary regressions, developmental curves
may also show accelerations, which are often the hallmark
of rapid changes that mark developmental transitions (see
for instance Fischer and Bidell, 2006). Such developmental
transitions are likely to be preceded by temporary regressions
(Van Geert, 1991; Fischer and Bidell, 2006).
Temporary regressions, accelerations, and temporary plateaus
are examples of non-linear forms of developmental change. One
can question to what extent such non-linearities also apply to the
development of ToM.
Measuring Potential Non-linearities in
Theory-of-Mind Development
In order to be able to observe potential regressions and
accelerations in ToM development, one should take two issues
into account. First, since ToM development does not solely
depend on the development of false belief understanding,
the research instrument used to measure ToM development
should involve a variety of ToM components, like emotion
understanding, belief understanding linked to actions (such
as false beliefs) and emotions, desire understanding linked
to actions and emotions, and relevant ToM precursors and
associated abilities, like the understanding of the difference
between mental and physical entities (Wellman, 1990). For that
purpose, we developed the ToM Storybooks (Blijd-Hoogewys
et al., 2008; see also “Materials and Methods”). Second, as there
is no convincing evidence that by the age of six ToM is fully
acquired (e.g., Hala and Carpendale, 1997; O’Hare et al., 2009)
and stable, research should aim at a considerably broader age
range, for instance up to 12 years old and even older (until
adulthood).
At first glance, a time-serial design would be superior in
order to follow the changing level of ToM over the course of
developmental time. This is a design with as many measurements
as are needed to capture the temporary and often non-linear
forms of change characteristic of a particular developmental
phenomenon in individual children (Steenbeek and van Geert,
2002; van Geert and Steenbeek, 2005). However, such a method
also brings along considerable logistic problems. Children need to
be tested repeatedly over an extended period. Also, since so few
research has focused on the dynamics in ToM development, it is
hard to predict at what time intervals children should be tested
in order to find evidence of developmental phenomena such
as accelerations and decelerations, transitions and temporary
regressions.
Meanwhile, a cross-sectional design might provide a
preliminary answer to the question of age-related changes and
potential critical points in ToM in the population, and is a first
step toward future time-serial research of developmental paths,
as they occur in individual children. However, it is becoming
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a well-established fact that a developmental curve based on
cross-sectional data should never be automatically identified
as a representation of individual developmental curves (e.g., as
the curve that applies to the ‘average’ child or the majority of
children), until it has been empirically demonstrated, with the aid
of a sufficient number of individual developmental curves, that
individual-based curves are statistically and structurally similar
to the developmental curve based on group data. This latter
condition is known as the homology or ergodicity condition, and
is rather unlikely to occur in the case of developmental processes
(Molenaar and Campbell, 2009).
Using Cross-Sectional Data to Tap
Potential Non-linearities in
Theory-of-Mind Development
Cross-sectional growth curves may serve yet another purpose
than serving as first approximations of phenomena that require
further scrutiny by means of individual time-serial designs.
In this article, we propose an alternative perspective on the
interpretation of cross-sectional data, which is based on the
obvious fact that making a test amounts to the performance of
a particular task, in which the child is asked to solve a particular
series of problems, framed in a particular format.
In general, there exist various ways in which task performance
can be used to obtain information about children’s development
and about what they have learned from experiences. One way
is to ask children to perform a familiarized and trained type
of task independently and without help, such as solving math
problems that are framed in a familiar and trained format,
to see how much they have learned from their math lessons.
Another way is to ask children to perform a particular task that
lies beyond the child’s capability to solve this particular task
independently, and to provide the child with help for doing so.
This is the approach taken in dynamic testing (Grigorenko and
Sternberg, 1998). A third possibility is to confront the child with
a novel task, and to observe how far the child can get if it has
to rely entirely on its own capabilities, eventually pushing the
child to its limits by giving counter-suggestions or by repeatedly
asking the same sort of question. The novel task can be novel
in terms of content, and/or in terms of the problem format.
In this case, the level of capability, development or learning is
defined as the ability to transfer knowledge or skills from one
context (e.g., the context of spontaneous daily experience and
actual behavior) to another context, which can be of various
kinds.
We contend that the administration of a ToM test that
the child is unfamiliar with, amounts to observing a child’s
developmental capabilities by providing it with a novel task
content and format. A cross-sectional administration of the test
that is likely to be a novel context for virtually every tested
child can thus be seen as a way of mapping individual and age-
related variability in the way children process this novel task,
by means of a highly simplified measure, which is the set of
sub-scores and the total test score of each individual. In this
way, a cross-sectional procedure provides yet another perspective
on a complex phenomenon, namely children’s development of
ToM that can only be fully understood if it is viewed from
a wide variety of perspectives. Hence, a cross-sectional design
provides an answer to the question of age-related changes in how
children transfer their knowledge about ToM that functions in
daily contexts of spontaneous activity to a new context, namely
that of explicit verbal questions and pictorial representations. It
should be noted that a repeated administration of the same test
may provide yet another kind of information, namely differences
between children in their ability to spontaneously learn from
repeatedly performing the same task (without feedback; Blijd-
Hoogewys et al., 2010).
Statistical Indicators of Non-linear
Developmental Phenomena
In order to describe changes in development, different fitting
models can be used to represent the general underlying
trend. In research, linear or quadratic models are often used.
Unfortunately, such models do not sufficiently take local
deviations of the distribution of data into account. This may lead
to over- and underestimations of the expected average scores in
certain age periods.
In contrast, non-parametric models, like Loess (or Lowess)
estimate smoothing procedure, follow local distributions of data
as reliably as possible. They apply a locally weighted least squares
estimate, and are commonly used as smoothing techniques
(see for instance Simonoff, 1996). Such non-linear techniques
can be of substantial value for testing non-linear changes even
when applied to cross-sectional data. Examples of such non-
linear changes are accelerations, decelerations, and temporary
regressions. Additional indicators of developmental transition
are changes in the skewness of the distribution, temporary
changes in growth rate and changes in variability (van Geert and
van Dijk, 2002; Bassano and van Geert, 2007; Van Dijk and van
Geert, 2007).
Changes in the skewness of the distribution over time may
provide information about alternations between periods of
relative stability (zero skewness) and periods of rapid change
beginning with a minority of rapid developers (positive skewness)
heading toward a new period of relative stability with a minority
of children lagging behind (negative skewness).
A temporary change in growth rate can be demonstrated in
the form of marked oscillations in the first derivative of the
developmental curve, which represents the rate of growth at that
point. A particularly strong instance of change in the growth rate
occurs in the form of a temporary regression (a local dip), where
the growth rate temporarily drops down to negative values. Since
the changes in skewness over time are related to accelerations in
the growth of the developmental phenomenon at issue, we expect
to find a certain level of coherence between the first derivative
of the non-linear ToM growth curve and the change of skewness
over time.
Change in variability, the third indicator of developmental
transition discussed in this article, can be observed as intra-
and inter-individual variability. A temporary increase in the
intra-individual variability is considered a strong indicator of
a developmental transition (van Geert and van Dijk, 2002).
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However, such an indicator can only be used in repeated
measures designs. Inter-individual variability, which is applicable
to cross-sectional data and which is expressed in terms of
standard deviation over a certain period of time, might also
temporally increase during a transition.
Although these three indicators are likely to be correlated,
if they are indeed indicative of an underlying developmental
transition, they are, in principle, independent of one another.
For instance, an acceleration in the group-based growth curve
might occur without any change in intra-individual variability,
or without any change in skewness.
Aims, Hypotheses, and Research
Questions
In the sections above, we have provided evidence for the
occurrence of developmental regressions and various other non-
linearities in the development of a wide variety of skills and forms
of knowledge. So far, no studies have explicitly looked at such
eventual non-linearities in ToM development. The objective of
this study is to investigate whether there occur developmental
regressions and other non-linearities during ToM development
in childhood.
In addition, we have seen that ToM is not a monolithic
ability. It consists of various sub-abilities, each with their
characteristic developmental timing. Hence, if ToM development
is characterized by non-linearity, it is likely that the forms of these
eventual non-linear properties will differ between various aspects
of ToM.
Finally, gender differences have been found in ToM
development, with girls having a slight advantage over boys. The
question is whether this difference is also observable in the form
of the cross-sectional developmental trajectories in boys and girls,
i.e., whether eventual non-linearities in the curves have a gender
specific timing or form.
Given the present state of our knowledge, all these issues
amount to open questions. So far, there is no theory from which
the answers to these questions can be predicted and that allows
us to formulate these questions in the form of hypotheses. In this
article, we will formulate a dynamic model of ToM development
that might serve as a first attempt toward such a theory.
To summarize, our research questions are as follows:
(1) Are there non-linearities in the cross-sectional growth
curve of ToM in the form of temporary regressions and
accelerations? (2) If such non-linearities are observed, are
they real or ordained due to statistical or sampling artifacts?
(3) Are eventually observed non-linearities supported by
additional indicators of non-linear change as described above?
(4) Are there differences in the eventually observed non-
linearities between (4a) the various aspects of ToM as
represented by the ToM sub-scores, and (4b) boys and
girls?
In order to answer these questions, we follow a cross-
sectional design, for reasons explained in the section on
tapping eventual non-linearities in ToM development. We
use the ToM Storybooks, an instrument that incorporates a
variety of ToM components. In order to describe the possible
temporary regressions and accelerations in ToM development,
we use techniques that also look at additional indicators for
developmental transitions: changes in the skewness of the
distribution, temporary changes in growth rate and changes in
variability.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
The ethical committee of the University of Groningen approved
this study and written consent was obtained in advance from
parental guardians. The methods were carried out in accordance
with the approved guidelines. Minors were involved. Their
parents were asked for written consent.
Participants and Setting
We tested 324 children. The ages ranged from three up to and
including 11 years, with approximately the same number of boys
and girls per age range (Table 1 for the age distribution).
The children came from preschools, kindergartens, and
elementary schools, from both provincial and urban regions in
the Netherlands. All children had a Dutch linguistic background,
and did not have language acquisition problems that could
have hampered their performance on the tasks (for the role of
language in ToM development and ToM performance: Milligan
et al., 2007; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2014; Ebert, 2015).
Two Dutch language tests were used, depending on the age
of the child. For 3–6 year olds, the Reynell was administered
(test for receptive language comprehension; Van Eldik et al.,
1997); and for 6–9 year olds, the TvK (Taaltest voor Kinderen,
Language Test for Children: subtests ‘vocabulary’ and ‘sentence
construction’; Van Bon, 1982) was used. Language scores were
available for 249 children (Reynell: n = 170, TvK: n = 79). Those
children who did not receive a language test were older than
6 years and judged as having appropriate language skills by their
teachers. Thirteen percent of the children came from a lower
social background, distributed over the whole age range. This
TABLE 1 | Age distribution of sample being administered the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) Storybooks (N = 324).
Age (in years)
3 4 5 6 7 8–9 10–11 Total
Boys 32 31 31 31 15 14 13 167
Girls 29 24 32 26 16 12 18 157
All 61 55 63 57 31 26 31 324
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percentage corresponds with the percentage as known from the
Dutch National Bureau of Statistics, at time of the research.
Measure
Children’s ToM knowledge was tested with the ToM Storybooks,
version Sam (Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008). It is a comprehensive
test, composed of multiple tasks, that measures a variety of
ToM components and associated aspects. The ToM tasks are
incorporated in short stories. These stories are illustrated with
full color pictures and enlivened by the use of cuddly patches
of fur, toy doors that can be opened, and magnetized emotion
faces that can be placed on the characters. The test takes 40–
50 min, including a short break (5 min of free play), also for the
youngest age group (no significant effect of fatigue was found;
Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008). Children experience the assessment
as a ‘being read to’ activity, rather than a ‘being tested’ activity.
In total, there are 34 tasks spread over six storybooks in total.
A maximum sum-score of 110 points can be obtained, which can
be divided into five sub-scores (for example tasks, see Appendix
A in Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008): (1) emotion recognition
(maximum = 14 points), (2) distinction between physical and
mental entities (real-mental, real-imaginary, and close impostors;
maximum = 44 points), (3) understanding that seeing leads to
knowing (maximum = 3 points), (4) understanding of desires
(maximum = 17 points), and (5) understanding of beliefs
(maximum= 32 points). The latter encompass tasks on standard
belief, changed belief, not own belief, explicit false belief, false
belief, inferred belief, and inferred belief control. In addition
to providing a single, quantitative measure of the level of ToM
ability, the ToM Storybooks also allow investigators to compare
various relevant ToM components.
Each task incorporates one to five questions, including both
test questions and justification questions. There are in total 74
binary test questions and 18 justification questions. The answers
to the test questions are coded as correct or incorrect (1 or 0
points; maximum of all test questions = 74). The justification
questions result in 2, 1, or 0 points, depending on the amount
and correctness of the mental state terms spontaneously used by
a child (maximum of all justification questions = 36). In order
to evaluate the justifications, a category system is used (for more
details, see the Appendices in Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008).
Since the ToM Storybooks is a comprehensive test, no other
ToM measures were included in this study. The test has good
psychometric qualities. The internal consistency [Cronbach’s
alphas: ToM total score = 0.95, ToM sub-score 1 (emotion
recognition) = 0.83, ToM sub-score 2 (physical/mental) = 0.88,
ToM sub-score 3 (seeing knowing) = 0.51, ToM sub-score 4
(desires) = 0.84, ToM sub-score 5 (beliefs) = 0.89], test-retest
reliability (r = 0.86, p = 0.001 for typically developing children,
r = 0.98 for children with PDD–NOS), inter-rater reliability
(Cohen’s Kappa = 0.81–0.97), divergent and convergent validity
are good (see also Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008, 2010). The
ToM Storybooks has been translated in different languages,
such as English, Finnish, French, Italian, and Spanish; and it
has been standardized on two European populations, namely
Dutch children (Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008) and Italian children
(Molina and Bulgarelli, 2012; Bulgarelli et al., 2015).
Procedure
All subjects were individually tested in a quiet room at school.
Test administrators were carefully instructed to follow standard
procedures. For practical reasons, kindergarten children were
tested at home. If necessary, the parent was allowed to be present
during testing but was requested not to interfere. The justification
questions were judged later on. The inter-rater reliability of the
justifications is known to be high (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.81–0.97,
see Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2008). The few differences left were
unanimously agreed on after discussion by four researchers.
Data Analysis
In order to acquire insight in non-linear changes in ToM
development, we used a descriptive non-parametric method,
namely Loess curve smoothing (Simonoff, 1996). Next to that,
we used random permutation techniques, and more generally,
Monte Carlo analyses, which are assumption-free techniques
(Kroese et al., 2014). Wellman et al. (2001) have argued for the use
of more assumption-free techniques, such as bootstrap methods,
in ToM research. It entails a simulation of the test statistic at
issue (e.g., a particular numerical indicator of change or of non-
linearity) as based on the null hypothesis, which can be compared
to our empirical ToM data (Good, 2001; Todman and Dugard,
2001; Manly, 2007).
RESULTS
Non-linearities in ToM Sum-Scores
The Loess smoothed curves of the ToM sum-scores
(maximum = 110 points) reveal three points of developmental
interest (Figure 1; see also Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2010). To
determine the exact timing of these points, minima and
maxima of the second derivative (acceleration of growth) of
the developmental curve were inspected. The most marked
inflection points are seen at 56 months (4 years and 8 months),
72 months (6 years), and 78 months (6 years and 6 months).
The second inflection point (72 months) is followed by a dip
in the curve, which shows its deepest point at 78 months. This
FIGURE 1 | The Loess fitting curve of the Theory-of-Mind (ToM)
sum-score data plotted versus age displays a non-linearity. Based
upon the second derivative of this curve three points of developmental
interests were found, namely at 56, 72, and 78 months.
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dip is a temporary regression or local U-shaped age curve. It is
the most striking deviation from monotonicity in the non-linear
developmental curve based on the data from boys and girls
taken together. More detailed analyses can be found in the
section ‘Non-linearities in ToM sub-scores and in gender based
sub-groups.’
Is the Temporary Regression at
72–78 Months Real?
It should be checked whether the non-linearity in the form of a
temporary dip is not the result of inadequate selection procedures
or of statistical artifact, such as accidental sampling effects or the
influence of specific, biased or incompetent test administrators.
To begin with, inadequate selection procedures are highly
unlikely since the selection procedure was carried out with the
utmost care and selection criteria were uniform over all ages.
Second, it is unlikely that the non-linearity in the form of a
temporary regression (a dip) is a statistical artifact. In order to
demonstrate this, the null hypothesis was tested that the generic
curve underlying the data is actually a monotonically rising curve
and that the dip is due to accidental sampling variations. The
latter could amount to an accidental overrepresentation of low
scoring individuals. In order to test this possibility, we calculated
the best fitting monotonic growth curve and a regression model
for the variances. Since we had no prior assumption about where
a non-linearity, in the form of a temporary regression, in ToM
ability should occur, we tested for the accidental occurrence
of an apparent temporary regression anywhere along the time
interval. Because a theoretical expectation about the length of
the temporary regression is also lacking, the null hypothesis was
also tested for time windows of different length. By means of a
Monte Carlo technique, we calculated the probability that the
null hypothesis model yields a temporary regression, comparable
to the observed one. The pattern of probabilities supported
the conclusion that it is unlikely that the observed temporary
regression is an accidental sampling effect of an otherwise
continuous, monotonically rising simple curve (Monte Carlo,
p = 0.01 through p = 0.05, depending on the length of the tested
interval). Another indicator for non-linearity in the form of a
temporary regression, namely negative slope (over intervals of
variable length), provided converging evidence (Monte Carlo,
p= 0.02).
Next, we checked if particular test administrators caused the
non-linearity in the form of a temporary regression (dip). We
defined eight groups of data sets by leaving out the data of
one particular test administrator at a time. If the temporary
regression is due to an anomalous test administrator, it should
disappear in the dataset from which this particular person
is lacking. We repeated the statistical procedure described
above for each of the reduced data sets. The resulting
p-values showed that the dip remained significant for each
of the reduced data sets (Monte Carlo, p < 0.001 through
0.05).
In summary, neither selection errors, nor accidental sampling
errors nor a deficient test administrator can account for the
occurrence of the observed non-linearities.
Non-linearities in ToM Sub-Scores and in
Gender Based Sub-Groups
We checked whether the main temporary regression (a dip
at 72–78 months) is observable in all five ToM sub-scores
and preferably in the core ToM sub-scores (on desires and
beliefs). For this purpose the ToM sub-scores were rescaled, to
make comparisons easier (otherwise they would have different
maximum scores). Loesses with a 20% window size were
calculated. All ToM sub-scores showed dips at roughly the same
age (Monte Carlo, p= 0.01; see Figure 2).
The curves of the ToM sub-scores showed the same
characteristics as that of the ToM sum-score, with start and end
of the major dip at roughly the same age as the dip based upon the
ToM sum-score (start: respectively, 71–74 months vs. 72 months;
end: respectively, 77–79 months vs. 78 months). The sub-score
on false beliefs displayed the steepest dip.
Second, we looked whether there are gender differences. On
average, girls had slightly higher ToM sum-scores than boys
(M = 71.71 versus M = 68.73, respectively; independent samples
t-test, p = 0.098). The variance hardly differed between both
sexes (20.82 and 20.44) and is considered equal (Levene’s test,
p = 0.749). When we divided the group in three age groups,
however, (n = 87, <54 months; n = 119, 54 < 78 months;
n = 118, ≥78 months), we found the gender difference to be
significant for the youngest and oldest group (p = 0.05); and the
variances within these two age groups were not equal (Levene’s
test, p = 0.01 and p = 0.05, respectively). Subsequently, we
compared the Loess curves for both genders (Figure 3). The
girls showed two non-linearities: an increase between the fourth
and fifth year, followed by a plateau (first temporary regression)
and then again a growth spurt between the fifth and sixth year,
followed by a dip (second temporary regression) and ending
with an ultimate growth spurt. The boys showed only one non-
linearity, namely a dip that was more pronounced than the
simultaneous dip of the girls. Through slope hunting techniques,
we investigated the statistical significance of these dips in the null
hypothesis model. The dip of the boys was significant (Monte
Carlo, p = 0.007). The dip of the girls (their second temporary
regression) was more flat and did not reach significance (Monte
Carlo, p = 0.20). However, this dip appeared around 3 months
earlier than in boys. If we reckon with the fact that ToM develops
earlier in young girls than in young boys (Charman et al., 2002),
the earlier appearance of the dip in the girls seems a meaningful
phenomenon. The probability that the occurrence of a dip of this
magnitude, appearing up to 3 months earlier, but not later than in
the boys is unlikely to be accidental (this difference is statistically
significant; Monte Carlo, p= 0.03).
Skewness and Variability as Additional
Indicators of an Underlying Transition
In the introduction, we discussed three qualitative indicators of
developmental transition, namely skewness, temporary changes
in growth rate and change in variability. Before further
analyzing the developmental ToM pattern, we first wished
to determine whether the hypothesized properties stated are
indeed characteristic of a developmental transition of the kind
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 January 2017 | Volume 7 | Article 1970
fpsyg-07-01970 January 3, 2017 Time: 11:44 # 7
Blijd-Hoogewys and van Geert Non-linearities in Theory-of-Mind Development
FIGURE 2 | Loess curves of the ToM sub-scores plotted versus age. All ToM sub-scores showed dips at the same ages as the dips found for the ToM
sum-score. ER, Emotion Recognition; D, Desire; B, Belief; FB, False Belief; MP, Mental Physical. The deepest point of the dip based upon the ToM sum-score is
pointed out with the arrow and dotted line.
FIGURE 3 | Loess curves of the ToM sum-scores plotted versus age, for boys (black line) and girls (gray line). The girls show two non-linearities, the boys
only one.
we now expect to find in the ToM data. In order to do so,
we mathematically simulated a transition model in order to
check whether the expected qualitative indicators occur. A good
example of a developmental transition is a two-step growth
process (for details on how such models can be specified
and simulated, see Van Geert, 1991, 1994; a two-step growth
process can easily be extended toward a three- and more-step
model if needed). This transition model can be found in the
Supplementary Material.
Figure 4 shows the Loess curves with a 30% window of the
skewness, growth rate, and variability of the real ToM data.
A mixture between a two-step and a three-step growth process
is apparent. There are two large peaks, with a smaller peak
in between, most clearly observable in the variability measure
(standard deviation) and less in the other two measurements.
The qualitative similarity with the model simulation of a two-step
process is striking. There are two peaks, both in the skewness and
in the first derivative (i.e., growth rate) curve. As is the case in
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FIGURE 4 | Loess curves of the three qualitative indicators of developmental transition based on empirical data. A mixture between a two-step and a
three-step growth process is obvious. There are two peaks, both in the skewness and in the first derivative curve. FD, first derivative (or growth rate); SD, standard
deviation (or variability).
the simulation, the peaks of skewness largely coincide with those
in the first derivative (growth rate), and the skewness peaks come
somewhat earlier than those of the first derivative. The covariance
of the series is 0.88, which is comparable to (and even higher
than) the high covariance that the simulation model predicted
(0.70).
Before concluding that the skewness and first derivative
data support the notion of a two-step developmental process,
we need to know what the probability is that a similar co-
variation of skewness and first derivative curves can be obtained
if the underlying statistical variation of the sum-scores is in
fact symmetrical across age (and not varying systematically, as
hypothesized). This null hypothesis model can be tested by
generating random series of sum-scores based on a normal
distribution model, with means equal to the successive values of
the non-linear growth curve and standard deviations equal to
the observed standard deviation of the residuals. Only 2 out of
the 200 simulated series had a covariance greater than or equal
to the observed covariance (p-value is ∼2/200, i.e., p = 0.01).
We can thus conclude that the skewness data provide further
independent evidence for the existence of at least a two-step
process in the development of ToM.
Is There a Two or Three-Step
Developmental Model?
As we mentioned before, girls evidenced a three-step
development and boys more a two-step development (Figure 3).
However, it is highly probable that also boys show a three-step
development. It can be hypothesized that the first transition
is observable only in girls, because of differences in major
parameters – in particular the value of the main parameter,
which is the growth rate – and not because of differences in the
underlying variables affecting the growth of ToM.
In order to show that this interpretation is indeed feasible,
we fitted a three-step growth pattern of ToM knowledge, based
on the emergence of two underlying, supportive variables, one
around the age of 56 months (A) and another around the age
of 72 months (B; Figure 5). These supportive variables are
hypothetical and may for instance include executive functions,
which are known to be an important facilitator in ToM
functioning (for the relation between ToM and executive
function see, e.g., Carlson et al., 2002, 2013; Devine and Hughes,
2014), also found across cultures (Wang et al., 2016).
The growth model that was fitted to the smoothed data
is of the type described by Van Geert (1991, 1994), and by
Fischer and Bidell (2006). It contains positive parameters, i.e.,
a supportive relationship, for the A and B levels and negative
parameters, i.e., a competitive relationship, for the first derivative
of the hypothetical A and B levels (which corresponds with
the actual change in these levels). Figure 5 shows the fit with
the smoothed curves of boys and girls separately, based on
underlying hypothetical variables A and B, which are of the same
magnitude and occur at the same age in both sexes. Table 2 shows
the values of the model parameters.
A striking difference between boys and girls is that the
parameter values cause faster growth and more effect of
supportive and competitive variables in girls than in boys. The
first discontinuity, a plateau, which is observable in the girls
thanks to their higher growth rate, is in fact concealed in boys,
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FIGURE 5 | A three-step growth pattern (broad striped line) fitted over
the smoothed ToM sum-score data (interrupted line), taking into
account the emergence of two underlying, supportive variables
A and B. The top graph shows the fit of girls, the bottom part shows the fit of
boys. The underlying variables A and B are of the same magnitude and occur
at the same age in both genders.
TABLE 2 | Values of the model parameters used for the dynamic systems
growth model.
Girls Boys
Growth rate 0.15 0.10
Support from A 0.33 0.10
Support from B 0.24 0.16
Competition from the growth of A 0.00 0.00
Competition from the growth of B −3.20 −2.50
as a consequence of their lower growth rate and lesser effect from
the A-variable (which is a hypothetical variable emerging around
the age of 4.6 years). The second discontinuity is observable in
both girls and boys. Although the competitive effect of B on
ToM is greater in girls than in boys, the observable effect is
more salient in boys. This finding may lead to the conclusion
that girls evidenced a three-step development and boys only
a two-step development. However, in dynamic growth models,
parameters often show non-linear co-variations, for instance
competitive effects among variables can be masked by higher
growth rates. The dynamic growth model (Figure 5) showed that
the expression of the steps in the form of observable plateaus and
marked dips may depend on the values of the growth parameters,
in particular the value of the main parameter, which is the growth
rate. It can be concluded that a dynamic growth model involving
the effect of two variables affecting the growth of ToM, one
occurring around the age of 56 months and the other around
the age of 72 months, can account for the variety of non-linear
phenomena observed in the data, including the differences and
similarities, the plateaus and dips between boys and girls.
DISCUSSION
Non-linearities in the Development of
ToM: One or Two Temporary Regressions
Our findings support the general developmental view of ToM.
Based on cross-sectional analyses of a ToM task that is new to
the children, our results show that ToM increases with age – with
the greatest increase between 42 and 56 months, that is between
3.5 and 4.7 years of age – and that it continues to develop after
the age of six. The development before the age of four and a half
is evidently monotonous. However, after this age non-linearities
occur. Two temporary regressions – one around the age of 4 years
and 8 months and one at the age of six to six and a half – are found
not only in the ToM sum-score Loess curve but also in the ToM
sub-score Loess curves.
The temporary regressions can be viewed as indicators of
non-linearity in ToM development. We have demonstrated
that the probability that the main temporary regression (a
dip at 72–78 months) is either a statistical selection artifact
or an experimenter artifact is very small. The application of
additional indicators – skewness, growth rate, and variability –
provided further support for the occurrence of a transition –
or two transitions – in the development of ToM, as evidenced
by an instrument that requires children to transfer their
daily knowledge to a context of explicit verbal questions and
pictorial representations. Also, the non-linearity found cannot
be accredited to gender differences. Both boys and girls showed
a marked regression around the age of six. However, girls also
showed evidence for an additional earlier regression (a plateau),
around the age of five.
There are different views on the manner in which ToM
develops in preschoolers. For instance, one view implies
continuous increases in ToM related processing abilities rather
than radical conceptual shifts in understanding mental states
(e.g., German and Leslie, 2000; Carlson and Moses, 2001; Birch
and Bloom, 2004). A second view assigns central importance to
the occurrence of a conceptual change. This change takes place
between the age of three and four/five for simple ToM skills
(Perner, 1991; Gopnik, 1993; Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman,
2014), and this conceptual development continues into more
advanced ToM skills at the age of eight/ten (Osterhaus et al.,
2016). Our data show a pattern of overall continuous increase,
with a steep growth of ToM knowledge around the age of four,
followed by a more continuous increase of ToM knowledge
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leveling off toward the age of five and interrupted by a temporary
regression around the age of six, which occurs in boys and
girls alike. Overall, we found boys and girls to follow the
same developmental path. However, we also found some gender
differences in ToM development. Such differences have seldom
been reported in ToM research (for exceptions: Charman et al.,
2002; Walker, 2005; Calero et al., 2013). In fact, most studies
find no statistically significant differences between boys and girls,
which might be due to the use of tests that are insufficiently
capable of capturing subtle individual ToM differences (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997), or have insufficient statistical power. Our
study included a more extensive sample than the majority of
studies did. In addition, we employed statistical techniques that
are sensitive to more subtle developmental patterns. Under such
methodological conditions, eventual gender differences are more
easily recorded from the data, not only in the appearance of
ToM skills but also in the rate of ToM development. The
early ToM growth in girls was more rapid than that of boys.
Gender difference in the rate of ToM development has been
hypothesized before by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) and by
Charman et al. (2002) who found that young girls have a
ToM advantage, which disappears as children get older. Such
a higher early rate of growth results in a greater likelihood
of a later temporary standstill (Van Geert, 1994), which has
indeed been demonstrated in our data, for girls showed two
non-linear changes in the form of temporary regressions (a
plateau and a dip), and boys only one (a dip). This is in
correspondence with the scarce research on the effect of gender
on ToM showing slight ToM advantages in both young girls
(2.3–4.3 year olds, Charman et al., 2002) and more profound
ToM advantages in older girls (6–8 year olds, Calero et al.,
2013). The more rapid ToM growth in girls might be due to
the fact that, from the beginning, girls are more focused on
sociability. For instance, already in 1 day old neonates, a definite
sexual dimorphism is observable (Connellan et al., 2000). Next
to that, girls also have better verbal abilities than boys (Halpern,
2000), stronger syntactic abilities and a larger amount of social
experiences (Charman et al., 2002). Language is considered an
important factor in ToM functioning (e.g., de Villiers and de
Villiers, 2014). Finally, there is some evidence that females show
more pronounced responses of the mirror neuron system than
males (Cheng et al., 2006); the mirror neuron system has been
hypothesized to directly relate to ToM abilities in both children
and adults (for a review see Oberman and Ramachandran,
2007).
Potential Explanations for the Observed
Temporary Regressions
In this article we reported the discovery of one or two temporary
regressions, indicative of either a two- or three-step development.
The literature on U-shaped growth and non-linear growth curves
in general provides some hints on possible explanations.
The first explanation is that the non-linearities reflect
a temporary conflict between competence and performance
(Marcus, 2004). According to this view, the development of ToM
competence follows in reality a monotonically rising function,
but for some accidental reason, performance on ToM tests gets
a little worse around the age of six, maybe because a particular
performance component interferes negatively. The question is
of course what this performance factor is. In addition, one
may question whether this competence-performance distinction
is relevant on the level of testable psychological functions.
Dynamic systems theory, as advocated by the late Esther
Thelen and her collaborators, makes no distinction between
these two levels, and sees a temporary regression as a direct
consequence of dynamic interactions between components
that are responsible for the production of answers to ToM
questions in specific problem contexts (Gershkoff-Stowe and
Thelen, 2004). According to this view, there is no ToM in
the sense of an identifiable, internal conceptual structure.
All behavior is soft assembled, and temporary regressions
reflect the “continuous changes in the collective dynamics of
multiple, contingent processes” (Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen,
2004, page 11).
Another point that we wish to re-emphasize is that, from
a dynamical point of view, cross-sectional data based on test
scores provide an answer to the question of how children transfer
their daily probably non-discursive experiences to a context of
repeated, explicit verbal questions and pictorial representations.
From a dynamic systems point of view, all forms of knowledge
expression reflect the process by which this expression has come
about. In that sense, all information about development reflects
the contextual conditions under which it has been obtained. It
is thus possible that the non-linearities found in our study are
a typical property of the current test conditions. However, this
eventual context dependency does not reduce the developmental
significance of the information obtained. The question is of
course which aspect/aspects of ToM related knowledge and
behavior is/are responsible for the observed non-linearities, in
particular the temporary regression.
According to Brainerd (2004), temporary regressions in
performance occur if a particular performance class – for
instance the class of ToM related questions – is served by
opposing strategies, or dual processes. It is conceivable that
up to the age of six, the child has employed an intuitive
and direct solution to ToM problems, while at around the
age of six a new approach begins to emerge, which is more
cognitive and reflective in nature (see also the hypothesis of
embodied/enacted and explicit/reflective perspectives on other
persons, e.g., Bohl and van den Bos, 2012; Fuchs, 2013; Gallagher
and Varga, 2014). The emergence of a second strategy –
for instance implying an explicit third person perspective as
Fuchs (2013) has called it – requires a form of reorganization
of components responsible for ToM performance, and the
observed non-linearities are likely to reflect this reorganization
(Feldman and Benjamin, 2004; Friend, 2004; Marcovitch and
Lewkowicz, 2004; Rogers et al., 2004; Wewrker et al., 2004).
That such non-linearities indeed occur as a consequence of
continuous, long-term growth in a developing system has been
demonstrated by modeling development, either by means of
connectionist networks (Rogers et al., 2004) or by means of
dynamic systems models of the type advocated by Van Geert,
Fischer, and others (see Demetriou and Raftopoulos, 2004, for
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a discussion regarding U-shaped growth). In these models,
long-term development is context-specific and dependent on
dynamic interactions among many components – biological,
cognitive, emotional, behavioral – that constitute the developing
system (Van Geert, 1991, 1994, 1998; Fischer and Rose,
1994; Fischer and Bidell, 2006; Fischer and Van Geert,
2014). Relationships between the multiple components in a
system can be supportive, competitive, conditional, or neutral.
The dynamics of these relationships over time explain the
emergence of phenomena such as accelerations, decelerations,
and regressions.
Based on dynamic modeling and indirect evidence from brain
development, neo-Piagetian theory predicts relatively major
shifts in development around the age of 6 years, dependent on
the context or content of the developmental function (Case,
1991; Fischer and Bidell, 2006). The shift is broadly associated
with a marked increase in more reflexive, coordinated ways of
thinking in contrast with the more intuitive, uni-dimensional
ways of thinking that precede it. Although the application is
purely speculative, it might be so that around the age of six
the intuitive ToM judgment, which is considered to be largely
based on biologically founded forms of empathy (Preston and
de Waal, 2002) is supplemented by a more reflective, cognitive
form of ToM reasoning (already constructed form age 4 onward;
Low, 2015). In this regard, it has been shown that six-year-
olds have little trouble assigning false beliefs to others, but
only arrive at a truly interpretive ToM at the age of seven
(Carpendale and Chandler, 1996; Lalonde and Chandler, 2002),
however, ToM continues to develop and change throughout life
(Moran, 2013; Vetter et al., 2013). Children with autism seem
to have an implicit ToM deficit (Schuwerk et al., 2015). As
predicted by the theories discussed earlier, this emergence of a
new ToM specific strategy in typical development might explain
the temporary regression found in our data. The fact that this
regression was found for all ToM sub-scores supports this way
of thinking.
The previous explanations all rely on the notion of distinctive,
developmentally ordered strategies for solving ToM problems.
In fact, there is supportive but indirect evidence of two
‘approaches’ to ToM: an intuitive (or automatic) and a reflective
(or controlled) route (Lieberman, 2007). Indirect evidence for
an intuitive, neuro-physiologically based understanding of ToM
related properties of other persons comes from the rapidly
growing literature on the neuronal systems that underlie the
spontaneous understanding of human actions and psychological
states of others. An example of such a system is the mirror
neuron system (for a systematic review see Hamilton, 2013).
It is hypothesized that through cognitively mediated routes
people with autism are able to compensate for the lack of an
intuitive ToM (Eisenmajer and Prior, 1991; Baron-Cohen et al.,
1993; Dissanayake and Macintosh, 2003). It is a strategy they
can only master if a verbal mental age of 11 years is attained
(e.g., Happé,, 1995). Typically developing subjects, on the other
hand, use the direct biology-based routes as well as the more
cognitive ones. Their understanding of ToM is a combination
of approaches and strategies (Lieberman, 2007), the combination
of which changes across development (Kobayashi et al., 2007).
It is not unlikely that the temporary regressions found in our
study reflect a major reorganization in the composition of
strategies.
It should be noted though that the non-linearities found in
our data need not reflect a difference in ToM understanding
per se, but could reflect a developmental difference in
other factors necessary for the task. For instance, attention,
inhibition, and ‘curse of knowledge’ may play a role (e.g.,
German and Leslie, 2000; Carlson and Moses, 2001; Birch
and Bloom, 2004). At the age of six, the development of
executive functions undergoes its first active stage of maturation
(Brocki and Bohlin, 2004). It is not unthinkable that this
development also has consequences for the ToM development
of children (Carlson et al., 2002). According to the emergence
account, executive function is even considered a necessary
condition for the acquisition of ToM understanding (Moses,
2001; Devine and Hughes, 2014). San Juan and Astington
(2012) have even suggested that executive function and
language abilities can aid the developmental step from an
implicit to an explicit ToM. However, Osterhaus et al. (2016)
found that advanced ToM abilities were not determined by
information-processing capacities (such as executive control:
working memory and inhibition), instead indicating conceptual
development.
Finally, data collected on children with PDD–NOS, an
autism spectrum disorder, (Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2010)
show a highly comparable dip in ToM scores. However, in
accordance with the developmental delay in ToM typical of
such children, the dip occurs at a slightly later age than in
the typically developing children. This delay in the timing
of the dip supports the conclusion that the dip is a genuine
phenomenon of ToM development, and not of interference
with some other non-ToM factor, which is not necessarily
delayed in children with PDD–NOS. Note that children with
autism spectrum disorder are also known to have executive
function problems (Blijd-Hoogewys et al., 2014; Craig et al.,
2016).
A Three-Step Developmental Model
Visual inspection of the graphs revealed that girls showed two
discontinuities (a plateau and a dip) and boys only one (a dip).
The dip of the boys coincided with the second (more shallow)
dip of the girls. The dynamic growth model showed that the
observable properties of the growth trajectories depend on the
values of the parameters governing the growth rate and the
supportive and competitive relations between the variables in
the model. A typical prediction of the model is that growth
rates will result in more clearly observable plateaus and less
clearly observable temporary regressions. This prediction is in
line with the observed trajectory of the girls: the fact that
they show an earlier growth spurt than the boys suggests
that the growth rate of their underlying ToM components is
higher than that of the boys. Consistent with this presumable
higher growth rate, the girls show more clearly observable
plateaus and more shallow dips. In short, the proposed dynamic
growth model might provide a speculative explanation of the
non-linear phenomena observed in the data, including the
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differences and similarities, the plateaus and dips between boys
and girls.
Limitations of the Research, Prospects
for Further Study, and Implications for
Clinical Practice
One limitation of our research is that it had fewer children
in the older age range (from 8 years on), which implies a
reduction in reliability at the older ages. Also, the test was
probably too easy for the older children since we did not
include more advanced ToM tasks that are typically mastered
at later ages. Perhaps additional regressions would have been
found at the older ages if second-order belief tasks (Perner and
Wimmer, 1985) or more complex emotional constructs would
have been used. However, not having included such tasks does
not change anything to our main message, that there are non-
linearities in ToM development, if it is viewed at from a cross-
sectional perspective, with children being confronted with an
essentially unfamiliar task, as far as their ToM knowledge is
concerned.
A second limitation of our research is that the growth
curve of ToM is based on cross-sectional data. This is only
one particular perspective on ToM development, namely
the perspective provided by asking children to transfer
their knowledge to a new and unfamiliar ToM context,
namely that of a storybook with explicit verbal questions.
Various other complementary perspectives can be provided,
for instance that of time-serial frequent measurements or
observations of individuals. As is now becoming well-established
knowledge, models based on group data should not be
seen as models of typical individual curves (see the earlier
remark on ergodicity in the introduction, Molenaar and
Campbell, 2009). However, there is also converging evidence
from longitudinal ToM research both in typically developing
children (see Figure 3 in Serra et al., 2002) and children
with PDD–NOS (Serra et al., 2002; Blijd-Hoogewys et al.,
2010), further supporting the robustness of this developmental
phenomenon.
Concerning future research, it might be interesting to
include a broader age group, also including second-order and
third-order belief tasks. In addition, it might be interesting
to focus on directly perceived and enacted forms of other
person understanding in the form of micro-observations of
social interaction in young children and to compare these
implicit forms of understanding with the more explicit forms
of understanding that a test like the ToM Storybooks is trying
to capture. A third possibility is to focus on the nature of
the explanatory schemes that children use or enact while
answering questions about desires and intentions. After all,
many questions focusing on the understanding of desires and
intentions evoke a potential conflict between a scheme of
persons as rational-agents (acting on the basis of the real
states of affairs in the world) and a scheme of persons as
psychological agents (acting on the basis of their knowledge
and perception of states of affairs in the world). Of course,
these schemes must be coordinated into a scheme of the
person as a rational psychological agent, but this process of
coordination might not be an easy accomplishment for many
children.
The findings of the current research may have implications
for clinical assessment and intervention. In the sixth year of life
(72–78 months), a dip in ToM understanding and reasoning –
in the form of answering explicit questions about imaginary
situations – seems common. Note that this is also the age
period in which ASD is often diagnosed in children (Miodovnik
et al., 2015). Test developers and diagnosticians should take
into account that children with ASD may at that time ‘appear’
to have less severe problems on a ToM test if compared to
their typically developing peers who are undergoing a temporary
ToM dip. Children with ASD show this dip much later (Blijd-
Hoogewys et al., 2010). This may appear counterintuitive, for
children with ASD do have ToM problems (Baron-Cohen, 2000).
Research concerning the impact of the ToM dip on clinical
assessment is needed. In individual children, the temporary
dip found on the group level might be expressed in the form
of temporarily increased intra-individual variability in their
reactions to questions involving ToM decisions, for example
shifts between direct, rapid, and primarily implicit understanding
on the one hand, and reflective, thoughtful and primarily explicit
understanding on the other hand, or shifts between rational-
agent and psychological-agent perspectives. In principle, clinical
interventions might explicitly reckon with the non-linearities
in the processes of ToM development, and focus on individual
indicators of such non-linearities in the form of rapid learning,
resistance to learning, response variability, and so forth, to adapt
the intervention to the idiosyncratic nature of the young client’s
developmental pathway. Also, ToM training should perhaps
focus mainly on acquiring an intuitive and direct way of ToM,
only taking into account the cognitive and reflective approach
after the dip-age has been reached (Gallagher, 2004; Gallagher
and Varga, 2015). How exactly this should be done is of course
a matter of further clinical research.
CONCLUSION
In sum, this article has explored the existence of non-linearities,
in particular temporary regressions, in ToM development.
Because little is known about the dynamics in ToM development,
a cross-sectional design was applied in combination with non-
linear fitting methods. Data from the ToM Storybooks, a
comprehensive measurement of ToM, showed that a two or
three-step developmental model can be distilled. One non-
linearity occurs at the age of 4 years and 8 months (a plateau),
and one between the ages of six to six and a half (a dip). These
non-linear phenomena could not be explained as accidental
sampling effects and were supported by additional indicators of
non-linearity, namely changes in skewness, in growth rate, and
in variability. The non-linearities, for instance in the form of
temporary regressions or dips, were observable not only in the
ToM total score, but also in the ToM sub-scores and in both
boys and girls. Boys and girls differed somewhat in the form and
timing of the non-linear properties. Finally, the dynamic growth
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 January 2017 | Volume 7 | Article 1970
fpsyg-07-01970 January 3, 2017 Time: 11:44 # 13
Blijd-Hoogewys and van Geert Non-linearities in Theory-of-Mind Development
models presented in this article might serve as a starting point for
the formulation of a theory of ToM in a broader developmental
context, focusing on the individual-in-interaction as the locus of
the developmental process.
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